So it's almost Carnival of the Africans time again - it'll be back on the 28th, and I'll be your host. Write something, check whether it fits our guidelines and then send it to me at ionian.enchantment@gmail.com. Or preferably, first check the guidelines and then write something. Anyway, DO send me entries!
Oh. And if you'd like to host the carnival, email me too...
Thursday, October 22, 2009
Lazy Linking
Your (sorta) weekly dose of lazy linking...
"Churches involved in torture, murder of thousands of African children denounced as witches"
"Churches involved in torture, murder of thousands of African children denounced as witches"
- A genuinely sickening report on Africa's growing witch craze. It's positively Medieval. And who's at the forefront? Yep, the churches. Religion and evil, who would have thought...
- A Slate piece on recent research by Aaron Sell and colleagues on adaptations for the visual assessment of formidability. I have in fact written a lengthy piece on Sell's research and once it's done and dusted, I'll post it here. Physiognomy is making a comeback. (Via Mind Hacks)
- A report on very clever research (pdf) that seems to demonstrate that going on the hajj may in fact make Muslims more moderate. Fascinating and surprising. Note: as far as I know, the research has not yet been published, so it's not been peer-reviewed. Buyer beware.
- I was genuinely saddened to hear of Margo Wilson's death. If you haven't heard of her before, go find out. In collaboration with her husband Martin Daly, she produced groundbreaking work on the Cinderella effect and homicide.
- Using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (in which people get small payments to do simple tasks) to do psychological experiments. Pretty cool, but rather fraught. (Via John Hawks).
- An op-ed in The Times by Simon Singh urging reform of libel law. He argues convincingly that England's preposterous libel laws not only limit freedom of expression, it limits people's right to know. A healthy democracy allows open debate and putting the onus on the defendant and not having a public-interest clause stifles such debate. It boggles the mind that these laws survived into the 21st century.
- A short but sweet post on Marginal Revolution about why blogging is good for you. Some of the critical comments are worth reading too: it's certainly possible to blog in a echoing chamber.
- David Sloan Wilson's inaugural post at his new home over at ScienceBlogs. Wilson, if you don't know him, is an eminent biologist and one of the leading proponents of neo-group selection. Note: some other dude seems to have posts on the same blog (despite not being listed as an author). Those posts are dumb.
Monday, October 19, 2009
Gene Callahan vs Evolutionary Psychology
So I recently had an uncharacteristic (and unpleasant) online altercation with one Gene Callahan about evolutionary psychology and, amazingly, whether Daniel Dennett should be taken seriously. I'm not blogging about this because it is inherently interesting (it's not), but because it nicely illustrates several common misconceptions about applying evolution to psychology and it reminds us that intellectual arrogance is a Bad Thing.
(I’d like to note before proceeding that it’s not as if I’m an uncritical fan of evolutionary psychology. There are, I think, numerous problems in the field, and the standards of evidence is far too often far too low. Some papers in the field are downright embarrassing (this one is the worst I’ve come across) and on my blog I have, among other things, excoriated Satoshi Kanazawa and critiqued Shermer’s application of evolutionary psychology to markets.)
Anyway, the saga in question started when a friend shared a blog post of Callahan’s on Google Reader in which he endorses John Dupré’s Human Nature and the Limits of Science, an uninformed screed against evolutionary thinking in psychology. (See this critique). I won’t have that much to say about the content of Callahan’s post – I will focus on his replies to my comments – but one remark about it is in order. Callahan:
On to the actual altercation… Callahan’s post rather annoyed me, so I left an aggressive – probably too aggressive – comment to the effect that (a) he is unqualified to have an opinion and (b) that he should read Daniel Dennett’s critique of the book. On reflection, I regret making point (a) as baldly as I did: I failed to err on the side of charity and to assume good faith. (Not to mention that I took Wikipedia’s word that he’s an economist, when he self-identifies as a philosopher, though I can’t help pointing out that he has a PhD in neither, so appending “in-training” is appropriate. Note: I don’t have a PhD either, so I happily concede I’m a wannabe cognitive scientist, not the real deal... yet). Understandably, Callahan didn’t take too kindly to my comment, so he replied aggressively himself, and then headed over to my blog and threw insults around on two of my posts: here and here. (Some tangential pedagogy: as I explained at length in my Fun with Fallacies post a while back, there is a difference between the ad hominem logical fallacy and mere insult. Callahan [I think, the comment was anonymous] calling me a “rude little punk”, for example, is not an instance of the ad hominem logical fallacy; even saying ‘you’re wrong and a rude little punk’ wouldn’t be fallacious. Only if he had said (or implied) ‘you’re wrong because you’re a rude little punk’ would he have committed the fallacy. There must be some inference drawn from some purported negative quality for the fallacy to occur, merely alleging someone has a negative quality is not itself fallacious, though of course it may be false or libellous).
Anyway, Callahan’s reaction to (b) was remarkable and illustrative: he dismissed Dennett’s critique of Dupré without reading it because he thinks Dennett’s work is a “rubbish heap”. Here’s what he said:
Callahan’s first point in the above paragraph, though, is far more interesting and so worth looking into in a bit more detail. At first I thought he couldn’t possibly believe it – that perhaps he was just pissed off and said something silly in the heat of the moment – but he failed to back down in subsequent comments, so he really does seem to believe it. In summary, his argument is: ‘I read x% of Dennett’s work, what I read was universally rubbish, therefore everything by Dennett is rubbish’. (Callahan calls Dennett's work 'a rubbish heap', so he's not just making the more reasonable claim that 'he couldn't be bothered to read more of it'). This argument too is invalid - though of course I hardly expect people to make consistently logically valid arguments in blog comments. The point is that it contains at least one false suppressed premise, namely: ‘if I’ve read some proportion of a scholar’s work, I can judge all of it.’ This is both arrogant and false, the latter since for it to be true everyone would have to produce either consistent rubbish or consistent non-rubbish: it implausibly rules out a mixed bag. Newton, again, produced utter nonsense and sublime science, Jared Diamond wrote both Guns, Germs, and Steel (one of the best books of the 90s is my opinion) and Why is Sex Fun? (which was very bad indeed) and so on.
As a rule of thumb, I’d say that unless (1) you have read a good proportion of some scholar’s output, (2) you are qualified to judge all of it, and unless (3) everything you have read is entirely devoid of merit and without any redeeming qualities whatsoever, making a black-and-white inference about an entire corpus of work is just not reasonable. (People who make a priori unlikely claims in conflict with scientific consensus, show no interest in justifying their claims, and who lack relevant expertise can in most cases be dismissed out of hand. Sylvia Brown’s books, for example, are just not worth paying attention to. I take it as obvious that Dennett does not come close to fulfilling these criteria). Given how much Dennett has produced I’m willing to bet Callahan has not satisfied (1), and I have serious doubts about (2) since as far as I know not even Callahan himself claims to be a qualified cognitive scientist or philosopher of mind. More importantly, the prior probability of (3) is preposterously low and Callahan thus has a huge burden of proof to discharge. For him to do so he would not only have to demonstrate (preferably in a mainstream peer-reviewed journal) that, say, Consciousness Explained (CE) and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (DDI) are rubbish but also explain why so many smart people – whether they agree with Dennett or not – were fooled into concluding the opposite. In other words, he must rigorously justify his initial contention not only that Dennett is wrong, but so wrong that his work is entirely worthless. And, if Dennett’s work is indeed utter rubbish, Callahan must explain why Dennett has been so influential: why, for example, CE has been cited 4700+ times and DDI 3000+ times. (Callahan objected to this point by saying it merely shows Dennett is famous, and mere fame presumably doesn’t track genuine merit. I responded that there’s a distinction between fame and influence: Dennett is both, Paris Hilton is only the former, Frege (say) is only the latter, and both Callahan and I are neither. Scholars just don’t see the need to read, let alone refer or respond to, utter rubbish so either Callahan is wrong or thousands of highly trained and really intelligent people are deluded. Of course, Callahan could be right, but I wouldn't recommend betting on it).
The moral of the preceding analysis, I think, is that intellectual arrogance is a very Bad Thing. I admit that I’m not exactly diffident, and that I have regularly fallen afoul of the principles I outline below. But I’m not nearly arrogant enough to dismiss whole disciples or declare all of an influential and prolific academic’s work utter rubbish. The common cause of such extreme beliefs, it seems to me, is overweening intellectual self-confidence, which is in turn arguably a product of an insufficient familiarity with one’s own fallibility. Cognitive biases and illusions are universal and ineradicable, the world is incredibly complicated and you can know only a fraction of the currently knowable. The mark of someone familiar with the above is scepticism, suspicion of bald assertions and hasty generalization, doubt, caution, a willingness to reconsider and admit error, and being scrupulously careful with facts and arguments. Callahan, it seems to me, fails to live up to these principles and the result is beliefs that, frankly, are downright idiotic. Or, as I put it rather more colorfully in my comments on his post, if these really are his beliefs, he should STFU, GTFO and take his FAIL with him. Srsly.
Of course, I could be wrong. Maybe I've been blinded by emotion, maybe I've been unfair, maybe I've misunderstood. If so, show me I'm wrong and I'll reconsider. Really.
(I’d like to note before proceeding that it’s not as if I’m an uncritical fan of evolutionary psychology. There are, I think, numerous problems in the field, and the standards of evidence is far too often far too low. Some papers in the field are downright embarrassing (this one is the worst I’ve come across) and on my blog I have, among other things, excoriated Satoshi Kanazawa and critiqued Shermer’s application of evolutionary psychology to markets.)
Anyway, the saga in question started when a friend shared a blog post of Callahan’s on Google Reader in which he endorses John Dupré’s Human Nature and the Limits of Science, an uninformed screed against evolutionary thinking in psychology. (See this critique). I won’t have that much to say about the content of Callahan’s post – I will focus on his replies to my comments – but one remark about it is in order. Callahan:
I’ve just been re-reading John Dupre’s wonderful take-down of evolutionary psychology, Human Nature and the Limits of Science. Now, Dupre never disputes the obvious truism that, say, human ethics or religion evolved. But he notes that this is remarkably uninformative, since everything humans do so (sic) evolved, including their ability to write papers on evolutionary psychology!This is somewhat cryptic and unclear, but straightforwardly interpreted, it is obviously wrong. To see why, consider the following. (I) Phenotypic structures (more precisely, biological processes) are either adaptations or the by-products of adaptations. (II) What distinguishes evolutionary psychology (at least of the Santa Barbara School) from sociobiology is the claim (see Tooby & Cosmides, 1987 [pdf]) that manifest behavior doesn’t evolve, modular information processing systems embedded in brains do. (III) Behavior is the result of a complex interaction between the environment and these information-processing systems; including direct environmental influences (e.g. drugs, brain injury) on the physical substrate of these information-processors. Observed behavior, then, is the product of the environment interacting with information processing mechanisms in the brain, and the brain is constituted of adaptations – structures that exist just because they increased fitness relative to alternatives in evolutionary history, including by producing or facilitating certain behaviors – or the by-products of such adaptations. It is therefore false that ‘everything humans do evolved’ since behaviors themselves don’t evolve, some behaviors result from by-products of evolution (not to mention pathology), and rapidly changing environments (the appearance of development of civilization, say) can interact with evolved psychological traits to produce novel behaviors (including writing papers on evolutionary psychology). The proposition that evolutionary psychology – broadly construed – is uninformative stems from these misunderstandings, and is indistinguishable from the crazy idea that evolutionary thinking generally is uninformative. Moreover, this claim is belied by the fact that we have discovered psychological abilities and traits (e.g., e.g.) that we didn't know about until we thought about human psychology from an evolutionary perspective.
On to the actual altercation… Callahan’s post rather annoyed me, so I left an aggressive – probably too aggressive – comment to the effect that (a) he is unqualified to have an opinion and (b) that he should read Daniel Dennett’s critique of the book. On reflection, I regret making point (a) as baldly as I did: I failed to err on the side of charity and to assume good faith. (Not to mention that I took Wikipedia’s word that he’s an economist, when he self-identifies as a philosopher, though I can’t help pointing out that he has a PhD in neither, so appending “in-training” is appropriate. Note: I don’t have a PhD either, so I happily concede I’m a wannabe cognitive scientist, not the real deal... yet). Understandably, Callahan didn’t take too kindly to my comment, so he replied aggressively himself, and then headed over to my blog and threw insults around on two of my posts: here and here. (Some tangential pedagogy: as I explained at length in my Fun with Fallacies post a while back, there is a difference between the ad hominem logical fallacy and mere insult. Callahan [I think, the comment was anonymous] calling me a “rude little punk”, for example, is not an instance of the ad hominem logical fallacy; even saying ‘you’re wrong and a rude little punk’ wouldn’t be fallacious. Only if he had said (or implied) ‘you’re wrong because you’re a rude little punk’ would he have committed the fallacy. There must be some inference drawn from some purported negative quality for the fallacy to occur, merely alleging someone has a negative quality is not itself fallacious, though of course it may be false or libellous).
Anyway, Callahan’s reaction to (b) was remarkable and illustrative: he dismissed Dennett’s critique of Dupré without reading it because he thinks Dennett’s work is a “rubbish heap”. Here’s what he said:
“Oh, and I’m not going to bother reading his [Dennett's] criticisms of Dupre. If I read several things by someone and they are universally rubbish, I really can’t be bothered to keep going through the rubbish heap. Anyone dull enough to have come up with the ‘brights’ idea really can be dismissed out of hand, don’t you think?”Wow. The first sentence is the most interesting, but note that the second is factually inaccurate (Dennett endorsed the Brights idea – as did Dawkins – but neither came up with it) and invalid to boot. Worse, the suppressed premise (pdf) that would make the argument valid - ‘anyone who has one really daft idea can be dismissed out of hand (on all topics)’ – is clearly false. Granting for argument’s sake that the Brights idea was daft, it’s simply not true that if someone has one spectacularly bad idea that everything else they say will be wrong. Newton had silly ideas about alchemy and the Bible, but that doesn’t mean we can dismiss the Principia. Linus Pauling obstinately stuck to the incredibly implausible notion that ultra-high doses of Vitamin C can cure cancer, but that doesn't mean his work in chemistry was worthless. Physicists with idiotic philosophical or religious views are a dime a dozen, but that doesn’t mean their work as physicists is necessarily bad. Is it really that surprising that a philosopher and a ethologist, respectively, could be persuaded to endorse a bad marketing idea? If they did so would it mean that their professional work was all worthless?
Callahan’s first point in the above paragraph, though, is far more interesting and so worth looking into in a bit more detail. At first I thought he couldn’t possibly believe it – that perhaps he was just pissed off and said something silly in the heat of the moment – but he failed to back down in subsequent comments, so he really does seem to believe it. In summary, his argument is: ‘I read x% of Dennett’s work, what I read was universally rubbish, therefore everything by Dennett is rubbish’. (Callahan calls Dennett's work 'a rubbish heap', so he's not just making the more reasonable claim that 'he couldn't be bothered to read more of it'). This argument too is invalid - though of course I hardly expect people to make consistently logically valid arguments in blog comments. The point is that it contains at least one false suppressed premise, namely: ‘if I’ve read some proportion of a scholar’s work, I can judge all of it.’ This is both arrogant and false, the latter since for it to be true everyone would have to produce either consistent rubbish or consistent non-rubbish: it implausibly rules out a mixed bag. Newton, again, produced utter nonsense and sublime science, Jared Diamond wrote both Guns, Germs, and Steel (one of the best books of the 90s is my opinion) and Why is Sex Fun? (which was very bad indeed) and so on.
As a rule of thumb, I’d say that unless (1) you have read a good proportion of some scholar’s output, (2) you are qualified to judge all of it, and unless (3) everything you have read is entirely devoid of merit and without any redeeming qualities whatsoever, making a black-and-white inference about an entire corpus of work is just not reasonable. (People who make a priori unlikely claims in conflict with scientific consensus, show no interest in justifying their claims, and who lack relevant expertise can in most cases be dismissed out of hand. Sylvia Brown’s books, for example, are just not worth paying attention to. I take it as obvious that Dennett does not come close to fulfilling these criteria). Given how much Dennett has produced I’m willing to bet Callahan has not satisfied (1), and I have serious doubts about (2) since as far as I know not even Callahan himself claims to be a qualified cognitive scientist or philosopher of mind. More importantly, the prior probability of (3) is preposterously low and Callahan thus has a huge burden of proof to discharge. For him to do so he would not only have to demonstrate (preferably in a mainstream peer-reviewed journal) that, say, Consciousness Explained (CE) and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (DDI) are rubbish but also explain why so many smart people – whether they agree with Dennett or not – were fooled into concluding the opposite. In other words, he must rigorously justify his initial contention not only that Dennett is wrong, but so wrong that his work is entirely worthless. And, if Dennett’s work is indeed utter rubbish, Callahan must explain why Dennett has been so influential: why, for example, CE has been cited 4700+ times and DDI 3000+ times. (Callahan objected to this point by saying it merely shows Dennett is famous, and mere fame presumably doesn’t track genuine merit. I responded that there’s a distinction between fame and influence: Dennett is both, Paris Hilton is only the former, Frege (say) is only the latter, and both Callahan and I are neither. Scholars just don’t see the need to read, let alone refer or respond to, utter rubbish so either Callahan is wrong or thousands of highly trained and really intelligent people are deluded. Of course, Callahan could be right, but I wouldn't recommend betting on it).
The moral of the preceding analysis, I think, is that intellectual arrogance is a very Bad Thing. I admit that I’m not exactly diffident, and that I have regularly fallen afoul of the principles I outline below. But I’m not nearly arrogant enough to dismiss whole disciples or declare all of an influential and prolific academic’s work utter rubbish. The common cause of such extreme beliefs, it seems to me, is overweening intellectual self-confidence, which is in turn arguably a product of an insufficient familiarity with one’s own fallibility. Cognitive biases and illusions are universal and ineradicable, the world is incredibly complicated and you can know only a fraction of the currently knowable. The mark of someone familiar with the above is scepticism, suspicion of bald assertions and hasty generalization, doubt, caution, a willingness to reconsider and admit error, and being scrupulously careful with facts and arguments. Callahan, it seems to me, fails to live up to these principles and the result is beliefs that, frankly, are downright idiotic. Or, as I put it rather more colorfully in my comments on his post, if these really are his beliefs, he should STFU, GTFO and take his FAIL with him. Srsly.
Of course, I could be wrong. Maybe I've been blinded by emotion, maybe I've been unfair, maybe I've misunderstood. If so, show me I'm wrong and I'll reconsider. Really.
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Skeptics' Circle #120 and #121
The 120th edition of the Skeptics' Circle is out at Pro-Science; it also features a nice discussion of the history of the carnival. Anyway, posts to check out: The Bronze Blog on how to deal with trolls and other annoyances, and Unleashed (part of the ABC stable of blogs) on the silliness of homeopathy. My post "Fun with a local homeopath" was included.
The 121st edition of the Skeptics' Circle is out at The Mad Skeptic. Have a look at: Effort Sisyphus on the goings-on at the NECSS conference (which was hosted by the NESS and NY Skeptics), Podblack Cat on the process of skeptical blogging (and what skepfails to avoid), and The Examining Room of Dr. Charles account of visiting a Darwin exhibit.
The 121st edition of the Skeptics' Circle is out at The Mad Skeptic. Have a look at: Effort Sisyphus on the goings-on at the NECSS conference (which was hosted by the NESS and NY Skeptics), Podblack Cat on the process of skeptical blogging (and what skepfails to avoid), and The Examining Room of Dr. Charles account of visiting a Darwin exhibit.
Encephalon #76
The 76th edition of Encephalon is out over at Neuroskeptic. Posts to check out: The Neurocritic asks whether neuroscience tells us torture doesn't work, Neurophilosophy on how vegetative and minimally conscious pantiens can learn, and Crime and Consequences on the silliness of neurolaw.
Saturday, October 17, 2009
Public Service Announcement: You have an immune system
As some of you might know: you have an immune system. In fact, you have an adaptive, extraordinarily intricate and complex immune system that evolved over hundreds of millions of years because there are innumerable tiny predators (bacteria, viruses, etc.) that, in effect, want to eat you. And, as anyone with immunodeficiency (whether innate or acquired) can attest, the immune system is almost always effective and, without it, you'd be in serious trouble. Even people with functional immune systems do get sick, of course, and this happens for several reasons, including that it just needs time to adapt (by evolving responses to novel infections) or because the system simply can't deal with the infection.
Why bring this up? Doesn't everybody know this? Well, I'd hope so, but many people effectively deny that they have an immune system when they claim something along the lines of 'I took medicine X, I got better, therefore I got better because I took medicine X'. My point is just this: you simply can't know whether you got better because of your immune system or because of X. Your immune system is really good at it's job - not perfect, of course, but damn good (see immunodeficiency again). And since it's adaptive - in a quite literal sense it evolves ways to deal with new infections - when you get sick and then better, it might be because you took medicine or because your immune system found an effective response (or both, or neither). But in an individual case you simply can't know. Concluding you got better just because of taking medicine - i.e. saying without taking it you wouldn't have gotten better - is an instance of the post hoc ergo propter hoc logical fallacy. That is, you're saying just because Z happened after X, it must be the case that X caused Z to happen. But of course this doesn't follow: Z (getting better) might have nothing to do with X (taking medicine) because X could just have been incidental, the real cause of Z might have been P (your immune system) or Q (the placebo effect) or something different. In general, the only - and I do mean only - way to decide in a rational way whether some treatment is effective or not is to do science: that is, do a properly designed, large-scale, double-blind randomized clinical controlled-trail.
Saying you got better just because sometime earlier you had taken medicine, then, is in effect to deny you have an immune system. Which is dumb. Take home message: (1) Thou shalt not rely on anecdotal evidence and (2) Thou shalt rely on evidence-based medicine (or, better yet, a variant known as science-based medicine).
Why bring this up? Doesn't everybody know this? Well, I'd hope so, but many people effectively deny that they have an immune system when they claim something along the lines of 'I took medicine X, I got better, therefore I got better because I took medicine X'. My point is just this: you simply can't know whether you got better because of your immune system or because of X. Your immune system is really good at it's job - not perfect, of course, but damn good (see immunodeficiency again). And since it's adaptive - in a quite literal sense it evolves ways to deal with new infections - when you get sick and then better, it might be because you took medicine or because your immune system found an effective response (or both, or neither). But in an individual case you simply can't know. Concluding you got better just because of taking medicine - i.e. saying without taking it you wouldn't have gotten better - is an instance of the post hoc ergo propter hoc logical fallacy. That is, you're saying just because Z happened after X, it must be the case that X caused Z to happen. But of course this doesn't follow: Z (getting better) might have nothing to do with X (taking medicine) because X could just have been incidental, the real cause of Z might have been P (your immune system) or Q (the placebo effect) or something different. In general, the only - and I do mean only - way to decide in a rational way whether some treatment is effective or not is to do science: that is, do a properly designed, large-scale, double-blind randomized clinical controlled-trail.
Saying you got better just because sometime earlier you had taken medicine, then, is in effect to deny you have an immune system. Which is dumb. Take home message: (1) Thou shalt not rely on anecdotal evidence and (2) Thou shalt rely on evidence-based medicine (or, better yet, a variant known as science-based medicine).
Friday, October 16, 2009
Video: Eyes on the Skies
There is more science to celebrate in 2009 than just anniversaries relating to Charles Darwin, 2009 is also the International Year of Astronomy. (Because it's the 400th anniversary of the first astronomical observations with a telescope). Anyway, since my fiancée is such an astronomy nut, I downloaded "Eyes in the Skies" for her, the freely-available official documentary of the IYA. (Alas, they don't have a single file for download, so you have to download 7 separate 'chapters')
My verdict: watch it. While it's not quite professionally produced, and while there is weird and annoying pronunciation throughout (e.g. NAzzzA for NASA), the actual content is great. It's basically a primer on the history of telescopes - not just optical, ones that observe all parts of the electromagnetic spectrum - and, most interestingly, it covers future telescopes that are being built or that are on the drawing board.
(Hopefully South Africa will win the bid for the Square Kilometer Array. That would be awesome).
My verdict: watch it. While it's not quite professionally produced, and while there is weird and annoying pronunciation throughout (e.g. NAzzzA for NASA), the actual content is great. It's basically a primer on the history of telescopes - not just optical, ones that observe all parts of the electromagnetic spectrum - and, most interestingly, it covers future telescopes that are being built or that are on the drawing board.
(Hopefully South Africa will win the bid for the Square Kilometer Array. That would be awesome).
Lazy Linking
"The Durban Boredom Festival"
"Dear Penn and Teller: Bullshit!"
- So a friend, my fiancée and I went to a local psychic fair recently. I was planning to write about it... but it was a horrid experience, so I never got round it it. Luckily, Angela (the aforementioned fiancée) has written a great account of what went down at the fair and trust me, short as it is, her post contains everything you'll possibly want to know about it. Overall conclusion: way too much incense, rampant woo, boring as hell, complete ripoff.
- BPS Research Digest reports on using fMRI et. al. to spot lying. Short version: it doesn't work. (At least not yet).
- Malcolm Gladwell's latest New Yorker piece in which he compares the morality of dogfighting - almost universally reviled - with that of American football. It turns out that, like with boxing, a football career often results in an Alzheimers-like condition called chronic traumatic encephalopathy. Amazingly, new resarch using accelerometers has revealed players regularly suffer hits to the head of up to 90gs. Not surprisingly this is a Bad Thing that does severe damage to the brain over the long run. Gladwell suggests this may make football morally comparable to dogfighting: the injuries and suffering of the players are an inherent and ineradicable feature of the game.
- As a big rugby fan I couldn't help wondering what the situation is like for my favorite Saturday diversion. Do rugby players also suffer as much damage? Obviously, only research could settle the issue (and some may already exist, I don't know). From the armchair, it's difficult to tell: on the one hand, there are many fewer hits to the head in rugby but, on the other, the players don't wear helmets or much protective gear. My (rather bland) guess, for the little that's worth, is that brain trauma is not as common in rugby as it is in football or boxing, but significantly more prevalent than in the general populace. I'm not going to stop watching though, that's for sure.
- A great Nature editorial calling for evidence-based clinical psychology in the United States. I'd say it's also much needed elsewhere, the training of psychologists is often criminally devoid of science or even critical thinking.
- "Clinical psychology at least has its roots in experimentation, but it is drifting away from science. Concerns about cost–benefit issues are growing, especially in the United States. According to a damning report [pdf] published last week an alarmingly high proportion of practitioners consider scientific evidence to be less important than their personal — that is, subjective — clinical experience."
- "The irony is that, during the past 20 years, science has made great strides in directions that could support clinical psychology — in neuroimaging, for example, as well as molecular and behavioural genetics, and cognitive neuroscience. Numerous psychological interventions have been proved to be both effective and relatively cheap. Yet many psychologists continue to use unproven therapies that have no clear outcome measures — including, in extreme cases, such highly suspect regimens as 'dolphin-assisted therapy'."
- Interesting piece by the excellent Ann Gibbons about new research on the causes of human genetic homogeneity (relative to other primates).
- "Modern humans are a lot alike - at least at the genetic level - compared with other primates. If you compare any two people from far-flung corners of the globe, their genomes will be much more similar than those of any pair of chimpanzees, gorillas, or other apes from different populations. Now, evolutionary geneticists have shown that our ancestors lost much of their genetic diversity in two dramatic bottlenecks that sharply squeezed down the population of modern humans as they moved out of Africa between 60,000 and 50,000 years ago."
- See also: John Hawks' fairly critical analysis of the same study.
- Razib Khan over at Gene Expression on how Ardi drives home the message that drawing analogies between humans and the other extant apes can be misleading. Six million years is a long time, and there's no reason to think our common ancestor with the chimps and bonobos was particularly chimp-like. Somewhat counterintuitively, the opposite might even be true.
- I've only recently remembered that I have Season 6 of Penn & Teller's Bullshit so I'm only watching it now. And like Massimo Pigliucci in the above post, I just hated their episode (6-06) on environmentalism. Libertarians so obviously have blinkers on when it comes to global warming that it positively amazes me that they're not more self-critical. It also reminds us all, of course, that being vigilant about our own biases is important.
- One of the most widespread misconceptions about Islam is that most of its faithful are Arabs. In actual fact, Asian Muslims vastly outnumber Muslims from other parts of the world, making up 61.9% of the global number of 1.57 billion believers.
- "A new survey of the world’s Muslim population, by the Pew Research Center based in Washington, DC, will help those who are keen to break that link [i.e. the perception that most Muslims are Arabs]. It estimates the total number of Muslims in the world at 1.57 billion, or about 23% of a global population of 6.8 billion. Almost two-thirds of Muslims live in Asia, with Indonesia providing the biggest contingent (203m), followed by Pakistan (174m) and India (160m)."
- "Perhaps more surprising will be the finding that the European country with the highest Muslim population is not France or Germany, but Russia, where 16.5m adherents of Islam make up nearly 12% of the total national population. Compared with other surveys, the report gives a lowish estimate for the number of Muslims in France (3.6m), as it does for the United States (2.5m); in both those countries, secular principles make it impossible to ask religious questions on a census."
- A superb edition of the Carnival of Evolution - there are many worthwhile posts to check out. My pieces on foxes and on chameleons were featured.
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