Showing posts with label Cognitive Science. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cognitive Science. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 24, 2010

Lazy Linking

"Psychopathy seems to be caused by specific mental deficiencies"
  • The Economist reviews research that used the venerable Wason selection task to reveal psychopaths seem unable to understand social contracts. This suggests (albeit weakly) that psychopathy is a frequency-dependent adaptation. 
  • Time magazine profile of the courageous James Onen, head of Freethought Kampalaan organization dedicated to science and reason in a highly superstitious country.
    "The Shadow Scholar"
    • Disturbing Chronicle of Higher Education profile of an 'academic mercenary' paid to write essays and other academic work for students. Scary stuff.
    • It seems to me that there is little academics themselves can do about this problem. If I suspect a student has paid someone to do her work for her, then what? I... hack her email account? The only long-term solution, it seems to me, is to criminalize the companies that provide these services - after all, they're arguably committing (or at least abetting) fraud. When the companies' records are seized, guilty students should be tracked down and punished. Degrees should be withdrawn, etc. I'm not saying this will solve the problem completely, but it'll at least lessen it, and provide some deterrent. 
    "Freaks, Geeks, and Economists"
    • The subtitle says it all: "a study confirms every suspicion you ever had about high-school dating".
    • Fallacies categorized and their family relationships mapped. Good stuff. 
    "This Is Your Brain on Metaphors"
    • Robert Sapolsky does great work, and this piece is as good evidence of that as any. He reviews a bunch of research which demonstrates that the brain conflates the literal and metaphorical. That is, certain 'higher' mental functions (like morality) is simply bolted onto 'lower' mental functions (like disgust). 
    • "Nelson Mandela was wrong when he advised, “Don’t talk to their minds; talk to their hearts.” He meant talk to their insulas and cingulate cortices and all those other confused brain regions, because that confusion could help make for a better world."
    "Tanzania's first elected albino MP fears for life"
    • What's the harm? This. This is the harm. 
    • Quacks + poachers = rhinos in trouble.
    "Not so fast... What's so premature about premature ejaculation?"
    • Jesse Bering strikes again. Premature ejaculation from an evolutionary perspective... Be sure to read the incisive comments.
    • Profile of Arthur Goldstuck, premiere cataloger of South Africa's urban legends. I attended the book launch, and I've read his latest book (The Burglar in the Bin Bag). Very good stuff. 
    • Arthur is on Twitter as @art2gee and blogs at Urban Legends.
    "What’s In Placebos?"
    • Apparently placebos are not all alike. Steven Novella covers the fascinating details and discusses the consequences. 
    "Palestinian Blogger Angers West Bank Muslims"
    • It's not exactly surprising that an atheist is unwelcome in the West Bank, but (1) it's still lametable that he isn't but (2) heartening that he exists at all. 
    "10 Bizarre Medical Discoveries"
    • Sample: symptoms of asthma can be treated with a roller coaster ride... 
    "Kasparov versus the World"
    • The fascinating story of Gary Kasparov's epic game against the rest of the world (well, a huge number of chess players who collaborated online). Kasparov called it "the greatest game in the history of chess".
    "The glorious mess of real scientific results"
    • This is written by Ben Goldacre. Go, read.
    "Calculate the Effect of an Asteroid Impact on Earth"
    • Go on, what are you waiting for? You know you want to...
    "Putting a Hex on Hitler, 1941"
    • Life covers a batty attempt to defeat Hitler... with witchcraft. 
    "There Are 5,000 Janitors in the U.S. with PhDs"
    • :-(
    • Another Economist piece, this time a review of the book A Wicked Company: The Forgotten Radicalism of the European Enlightenment. According to the review, the book is the story of the salon presided over by the (unjustly forgotten - but not by me) Baron d'Holbach
    "The Fascinating Story of the Twins Who Share Brains, Thoughts, and Senses"
    Pretty / WOW / heh

    "'Dance Your Ph.D. 2010' Winner Announced"
    • This is just wonderful. Watch the video, srsly.
    "National Geographic's Photography Contest 2010"
    • Must see gorgeousness from Big Picture.
    "Wildlife through the lens"
    • Beautiful wildlife photography.
    "The Difference Between Jesus and Zombies"
    • heh
    "What I Think About Atlas Shrugged"
    • Sci-fi author John Scalzi rips into Ayn Rand. Hilarity results. 

    Tuesday, November 23, 2010

    15 Authors

    There is a meme going round Facebook called "15 Authors" in which you list (you guessed it) 15 authors who have "influenced you and that will always stick with you". This is mine...

    1. Joseph Heller -- Catch-22 is funniest book ever written - also: it's profound. Pity the fools who don't get it. [You know who you are].
    2. Sophocles -- his plays are masterpieces. I've read Oedipus Rex five times, and it still gives me goose-bumps.
    3. Dan Dennett -- too many brilliant books to count. Darwin's Dangerous Idea is arguably one of the best non-fiction books of the 90s. His "Postmodernism and Truth" shaped my thinking significantly.
    4. Jorge Louis Borges -- author of innumerable mind-bending and beautiful short-stories. If you've not done so yet, listen to "The Library of Babel" (the mp3 is here).
    5. John Stuart Mill -- On Liberty is his most important book, but his autobiography and A System of Logic are also very good.
    6. Mancur Olson -- An economist actually worth reading. The Logic of Collective Action and Power and Prosperity are both must-reads. (The speculation about the origins of states in P&P is fantastic).
    7. Vladimir Nabokov -- I've not read enough of his work, but Lolita is a disturbing, incisive study of obsession. His prose is sublime.
    8. Simon Blackburn -- I actually like only one of his books - Think. The latter is the best single-volume introduction to philosophy. I read it at a pivotal time in my intellectual development.
    9. Steven Pinker -- possibly the best popularizer of science around. Like Think, I read How the Mind Works at a pivotal time: it was really the start of my interest in science as a whole, and psychology and evolution in particular. The Blank Slate is also excellent.
    10. Jared Diamond -- Guns, Germs and Steel is in my opinion THE best non-fiction book of the 90s. Must. Read. The Third Chimpanzee is also worth a read. (But avoid Why is Sex Fun?)
    11. Cormac McCarthy -- The Road and Blood Meridian are wonderful both. I've decided to read his entire oeuvre over the next couple of years.
    12. Paul Theroux -- his travel writing is something to behold. I'm not a huge fan of his fiction, other than The Mosquito Coast.
    13. Richard Dawkins -- He's had a tremendous influence on me. The Selfish Gene first introduced modern theoretical biology to me, and it's had a lasting impact. The God Delusion inspired me to "come out" to my family as an atheist. His best book since The Blind Watchmaker is The Ancestor's Tale, if you haven't read it yet, do so.
    14. Malcolm Gladwell -- my favorite science journalist. I've read all three of his books (Outliers is the best, followed by Blink, then The Tipping Point). He's actually on the list for his long-from New Yorker essays. Have a look at his archive.
    15. John Rawls -- A Theory of Justice is the locus classicus of 20th century political philosophy. Reading it had an absolutely profound effect on me.

    Wednesday, September 29, 2010

    Lazy Linking

    "This is a news website article about a scientific finding"
    • Martin Robbins' absolutely wonderful parody of bad science reporting. I really can't recommend it enough. 
    • Also: read the superb comments (well, some of them at least - there are over 500). 
    "An Ode to the Many Evolved Virtues of Human Semen"
    • Jesse Bering on the psychological effects of semen (mostly on women). He covers tons of fascinating research, including the finding that semen may have an anti-depressant effect. (Though, as this comment points out, there is a serious confound). 
    • Best line: “I’m not a medical doctor, but my testicles are licensed pharmaceutical suppliers”. (Said in jest, by the way). 
    • Anthropologist Pascal Boyer pwns lefty/po-mo academics. 
    • Pew surveys Americans about their knowledge of religion. Shocking ignorance found. (You can take a quiz featuring some of the questions in the survey. FWIW, I got 13 out of 15...)
    • Amazingly, only 85% of the respondents knew that an atheist is a person who doesn't believe in God. A finding consistent with the existence of 'atheists' who believe in God. (Yes, that is a contradiction in terms, but there you go).
    "I was wrong about veganism. Let them eat meat – but farm it properly"
    • I'm not linking to this for the content, but for George Monboit's wonderful demonstration that there is honor in saying "I was wrong". I've never been a fan of Monboit's, but his willingness to write this column certainly sways my opinion more to the positive side. 
    • Yes, says Ed Yong. They should (do their best to) side with truth
    "Power Leads Us to Dehumanize Others"
    • BPS Research Digest reviews research that vindicates Lord Acton. (Not that there was much doubt to begin with). 
    "Ratzinger is an Enemy of Humanity"
    • Richard Dawkins brilliantly responds to the Pope's deeply idiotic comment comparing atheists to Nazis. Read it. 
    • Excellent piece at Ars Technica by Chris Lee on the evils of confirmation bias - our tendency to see only what we expect to see. Lee looks at the topic through the lens of various scientific controversies, including Jacques Benveniste's 'water memory' nonsense. 
    • China's answer to Ben Goldacre, Fang Shimin, gets beaten up and threatened, apparently by plagiarists and/or charlatans who stand to lose from being exposed. Shocking. 
    • Another fascinating study covered by BPS Research Digest.
    • The researchers compared 'global' vs. 'local' thinking among "Dutch Conservative Calvinists (a form of Protestantism), Liberal Calvinists (who aren't so strict), Conservative Calvinists turned atheist and life-long atheists." 
    • The results were surprising: "the life-long atheists showed the strongest bias for the big picture, followed by the Liberal Calvinists, and then the Conservative Calvinists and the former Conservative Calvinists turned atheist. The latter two groups performed similarly suggesting that more than seven years without religious practice wasn't enough to remove the effects of the religion on a person's attentional mindset."
    Heh / LOL / Wow

    "The Real Stuff White People Like"
    • Absolutely fascinating analysis of 526,000 OkCupid profiles reveals the differences in tastes between White, Black and Asian males and females. 
    • The sample is unlikely to be representative, but it's interesting nonetheless. 
    "The Data So Far"
    • Classic xkcd... (For xkcd n00bs: read the mouse-over text).
    • Astronomy porn at its finest. #7 and #11 are especially good.
    • Need I say more?

    Monday, July 26, 2010

    A decidedly weird response

    I forgot to mention the rather weird response David Spurrett and I received from the authors of the WEIRD paper I reported on the other day. For those of you who missed it, David and I basically agreed with Henrich et. al. (pdf) that Western undergraduates are often extreme outliers (i.e. weird), and that it is therefore extremely problematic that the behavioral science literature has relied so heavily on this group. Or, as we put it in our abstract: a literature focused on outliers is flawed. We went on to argue, though, that Henrich and his colleagues missed another big problem: most behavioral scientists are themselves deeply WEIRD - likely even weirder than their subjects.

    As usual for Behavioral & Brain Sciences, the authors responded to all the open peer-commentaries, including ours. Here is what Henrich and co had to say about our piece (the weird bit in bold):
    Finally, Meadon & Spurrett suggest that one important way of addressing these challenges is to bring more non-WEIRD researchers into the process. Empirical findings should be peer reviewed by researchers who bring different cultural models and implicit expectations to the problem. We agree with all these suggestions: Researchers can view phenomena from a novel perspective, not constrained by their own intuitions, when they study those from other cultures, and can potentially discover phenomena that they otherwise would not see. However, we disagree with an extreme version of this argument, which proposes that researchers should entirely avoid studying people from their own culture. Researcher’s intuitions about the ways people in their own cultures think can be a useful source of understanding in building theories and in honing research instruments. 
    Well.... sure. But David and I never suggested anything of the kind, and it's not an idea either of us has ever taken seriously. Indeed, that researchers have some advantages when studying their own cultures was part of our point. There are excellent reasons to think diverse research communities are better, so one reason additional non-WEIRD researchers would be useful is that they often have different biases, so they may spot hidden assumptions, value judgments masquerading as facts or other problems that WEIRD researchers may miss. A Nepalese psychologist peer-reviewing a German study - even on German subjects - may see something someone as WEIRD as a German researcher overlooked, for example. But, equally importantly, a Nepalese researcher often has different knowledge like hard-to-learn cultural sensitivity, in-depth knowledge of both a local language and academic English (vital for accurate translation), or an understanding of some important nuance. So, yes, people studying their own cultures "can be a useful source of understanding in building theories and in honing research instruments". That was part of our point.

    Anyway, the rest of Henrich et. al.'s response to our commentary, in which they make several excellent points:
    More non-WEIRD researchers should be brought into the discussion, as well as onto collaborative research teams. Research teams themselves that better reflect broad global diversity can more effectively address the challenges delineated by Fessler, Rochat, and Bennis. [other commentators on the paper]. With regard to these points, it is instructive to consider why psychology is more dominated by American research than any other science (May 1997). One possibility is that pursuing a career in psychology is a luxury that people cannot afford until the countries and societies in which they live have achieved sufficient economic evelopment. This may be part of the explanation, although this would not explain why universities in wealthy societies like those of Japan and Western Europe typically have proportionately smaller complements of psychology researchers and majors than do North American universities. Another possibility, which we highlight here, is that the field’s emphasis on WEIRD samples, coupled with the guiding assumption of universal psychological processes, tends to unintentionally marginalize international research. If non-WEIRD researchers are interested in extending findings initially established with WEIRD samples in their home populations, such as findings associated with motivations for self-enhancement, they may well be unable to replicate the American results. The implicit assumption that self-enhancement motivations are similar everywhere would suggest that such failed replications are not due to the nature of the samples studied but instead due to some kind of unspecified deficiency in the methods of the non-WEIRD researchers. American researchers have a distinct advantage in that the field’s key theories were largely constructed on data from American participants, and we suggest that this is likely why American research constitutes 70% of the field’s citations. International research suffers from the disadvantage of trying to extend American-based theories with participants who often have different psychological tendencies, yielding results that are difficult to interpret while embracing an untested assumption of universal psychological processes. In contrast, if the field comes to recognize that psychological phenomena cannot be assumed to be universal until demonstrated as such, then research conducted by non-WEIRD researchers, guided by non-WEIRD intuitions, and studied with non-WEIRD samples, would come to be viewed as particularly important for understanding human psychology.
    For more discussion, see the comments on my WEIRD post over on Google Buzz, featuring contributions by David, yours truly and the most excellent Simon Halliday.

    Saturday, July 24, 2010

    Are most experimental subjects in behavioral science WEIRD?

    Note: here is a follow up post.

    My supervisor David Spurrett and I have a commentary on an important paper - "The weirdest people in the world?" (pdf) - in the most recent edition of Behavioral & Brain Sciences. The authors of the paper, Canadian psychologists Joseph Henrich, Steven Heine and Ara Norenzayan, argue that most experimental subjects in the behavioral sciences are WEIRD - Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic - and thus weird - not representative of most human beings. And this, if true, is a very serious problem indeed. Behavioral scientists (anthropologists, psychologists, behavioral economists and so on) are often interested in explaining the brains, minds and behavior of Homo sapiens as a species. (Some scientists, of course, are only interested in understanding specific cultures or what makes us different, but one important goal of the behavioral sciences has long been to explain universal human behavior). As evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides have put it, they "seek to characterize the universal, species-typical architecture of [the information-processing mechanisms that generate behavior]".

    But... Henrich and his colleagues review a large body of literature that seems to show that, across several domains, Western undergraduates - the workhorses of the behavioral sciences - are extreme outliers. In other words, if they are correct, most of the data behavioral scientists have used to test hypothesis and to drive theorizing derives from subjects who are possibly the least suited for generalizing about the human race. Take as an example the Müller-Lyer illusion. In the diagram below, the lines labeled "a" and "b" are exactly equal in length, but many subjects perceive "b" as longer than "a".


    This finding (which goes back all the way to 1889) has been used to make deductions about how the human visual system works. The Wikipedia article on the illusion, for example, states that one possible explanation for the effect is that "the visual system processes that judge depth and distance assume in general that the 'angles in' configuration corresponds to an object which is closer, and the 'angles out' configuration corresponds to an object which is far away". Plausible enough. Except that for some people - San foragers, for example - the illusion does not exist, and in many other non-WEIRD societies the effect size is significantly smaller. Henrich and his colleagues cite the work of Segall et. al. (1966), who worked out the magnitude of the illusion across 16 societies by varying the relative lengths of "a" and "b" and then asking subjects to indicate when they thought the lines were equal. The percentage by which "a" must be longer than "b" before the lines are adjudged equal - what they call the "point of subjective equality" (PSE) - varies substantially between subjects from different cultures - and, importantly, WEIRD-subjects are extreme outliers. The results are summarized in the following graph:


    Both WEIRD adults and children (aged 5-11) require "a" to be 18%+ longer than "b" before they're perceived as equal, but for the San and South African miners, the illusion simply does not exist - their PSEs are not statistically distinguishable from 0. Why this difference arises is unknown, but Segall et. al. claim it is due to WEIRD people's visual systems developing differently because modern environments expose them to ("unnatural") shapes like 'carpeted corners', thus calibrating their visual systems in a way that favors the emergence of the illusion. Whatever the true explanation, however, it is clear that it is not permissible to use the existence of the illusion among WEIRD subjects to make inferences about the visual system. This is especially true since the San subjects were hunter-gatherers, just like all people for the vast majority of human evolutionary history. Given that species-typical features of the visual system would have evolved in this period, it is particularly telling that PSE seems to be positively correlated with the 'modernity' of the societies in question. (Warning: this is an "eyeball" observation; I haven't done a proper statistical analysis. Caveat emptor).

    This is one example from an extremely long paper, but it conveys a flavor of the kind of evidence the authors present. (For much more, see "We agree it's WEIRD, but is it WEIRD enough?" over at Neuroanthropology). Having read the article very carefully, and despite some concerns, I think Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan are right: the Western undergraduate is often unrepresentative of humanity, and the behavioral science literature needs a lot of fixing as a result. (Most obviously, we need far more large, highly-powered, globally representative, prospectively designed, cross-cultural studies). Serious as this is, unfortunately, it gets worse... Since David and I worked extremely hard to present our argument clearly and concisely in our commentary (pdf - our piece starts on p. 44 of the pdf, paginated by BBS as p. 104), and I doubt I could improve on it, what follows is a slightly edited - simplified and somewhat de-academicized - version of the meat of our argument. (Note: each issue of BBS consists of a "target article" - in this case, Henrich et. al. - and 20 or so short peer-commentaries).

    Henrich et al. underplay – to the point of missing – that how the behavioural sciences research community itself is constituted introduces biases. That the subject-pool of behavioural science is so shallow is indeed a serious problem, but so is the fact that the majority of behavioural researchers are themselves deeply WEIRD. People in Western countries have, on average, a remarkably homogeneous set of values compared to the full range of worldwide variability (Inglehart & Welzel 2005), and the data Henrich and his colleagues present suggest similarly population-level homogeneity in cognitive styles. Moreover, academics are more uniform than the populations from which they are drawn, so it is likely behavioral scientists are even WEIRDer than their most common subjects. Henrich and his colleagues review a bunch of studies and experiments that did not strike those who designed and conducted them as focused on outliers. Intelligent scientists acting in good faith conducted, peer-reviewed, and published this research, in many cases honestly believing that it threw light on human nature. This forcefully illustrates the power of the biases on the part of researchers themselves. It also suggests that, besides widening the pool of subjects, there are significant gains to be made by broadening the range of inputs to the scientific process, including in the conception, design, and evaluation of empirical and theoretical work. Given that diverse groups are demonstrably better at some kinds of problem solving, as things stand, the WEIRD-dominated literature is robbed of potentially worthwhile perspectives, critiques, and hypotheses that a truly global research community could provide. Clearly, simply increasing the number of behavioural sciences researchers will, in general, be beneficial. Our key contention, though, is that the marginal benefits of additional Western researchers are much smaller than the marginal benefits of more non-Western researchers, among other things, just because they are non-Western.

    The non-Western world, in short, can contribute not only additional subjects to experiment upon – the main focus of the target article’s recommendations – but also additional researchers, with novel perspectives and ideas and who are less affected by WEIRD biases. (Naturally, these researchers will have biases of their own. Our claim is not that there is someone who consistently knows better; it is that diverse groups of investigators can avoid some kinds of error.) Clearly, these researchers will have to be educated, will likely be middle class, and, since science flourishes in politically open societies, they will tend be concentrated in liberal countries. Nevertheless, additional non-Western researchers, even if they are educated and relatively wealthy, could be a boon to the behavioural sciences.

    A direct and powerful way to remedy both sources of bias – too many WEIRD subjects and too few non-WEIRD researchers – is to foster research capacity in the non-Western world. Non-WEIRD researchers tend to study non-WEIRD subjects, so increasing their number will deepen the subject pool and widen the range of inputs to the scientific process at the same time. Building research capacity, however, should not merely involve collaborations led by WEIRD researchers; it should aim to generate studies led and initiated by non-Western researchers. Committed and long-term inter-institutional collaboration between Western and non-Western universities focused on remedying the deficits in the behavioral sciences literature should include internships at Western universities for non-Western researchers, stints at non-Western universities for WEIRD researchers, and extensive student exchange programs (especially for graduate students). Unlike many existing scholarship and exchange programs in the sciences, a key point of the necessary programs should be for the learning to proceed in both directions.

    ----------------------------------
    ResearchBlogging.org Henrich, J., Heine, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33 (2-3), 61-83 DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X0999152X

    Meadon, M., & Spurrett, D. (2010). It's not just the subjects – there are too many WEIRD researchers Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33 (2-3), 104-105 DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X10000208

    Sunday, June 20, 2010

    Anecdotes as evidence

    An anecdote is a tale, story or an account of events that is sometimes humorous or meant to convey a moral, but is often taken as evidence. In this latter sense there are two broad categories. Firstly, there is testimony, i.e., inferring that such-and-such happened or is true because someone said so. For simplicity's sake, we can further divide testimony into a bunch of different subtypes, most notably, into eyewitness testimony, expert testimony and hearsay. The second broad category of anecdotal evidence is personal experiences (or, if you will, ‘personal testimony’) that takes the form 'I saw so-and-so, therefore it is reasonable for me to believe such-and-such'. Note the key similarity and key difference between these two categories: in both cases someone's experience (or alleged experience) is taken as evidence for some claim, but, for testimony and not for one's own experiences, one has to believe a particular experience occurred on someone else's say-so. Now, it seems perfectly reasonable to believe some things on testimony or personal experience - indeed life would be impossible without it. I am currently having the personal experience of sitting on my couch with my notebook on my lap while typing this post. Hyperbolic doubt aside, I have no good reasons to doubt that his is what is really going on, and you have little reason to doubt my testimony. On the other hand, however, it is common for people to believe wild or improbable things – that aliens regularly visit earth, that highly diluted substances can cure any illness, etc. – solely on the strength of anecdotes. So what exactly is the evidentiary status of anecdotes?

    It is vital, first, to distinguish between two types of proposition that anecdotes can be claimed to be evidence for: causal and observational propositions. A causal claim is of the form “P caused X” (or “P, Q and R caused X”) and an observational proposition is “P happened” (or “P occurred, then Q happen and after that R”). This distinction is important for a simple reason: an anecdote can in isolation (almost) never establish the truth or falsehood of a causal claim, it can only be evidence for observational propositions. Why this is the case will be clearer if we think through some concrete examples.

    Consider the claim “Mary cheated on John with Bob”. This kind of proposition is pretty straightforward. I can convince myself it is true simply by determining whether Mary and John are in an exclusive relationship, and, if I see Mary make out with Bob, I can reasonably conclude the proposition is true. Now, obviously, there are a bunch of ways I could get it wrong: maybe the woman involved wasn’t Mary, maybe it was simply a friendly hello kiss, or maybe Mary had broken up with John (so it’s making out, but not cheating). It’s clear, though, that if I’m just a little careful, there are a wide variety of circumstances in which I could be very confident Mary did in fact cheat based on my personal experiences. There are a couple of extra complications when John has to decide whether to believe my testimony – maybe I’m lying, for example – but, again, these are not difficult to understand even if they’re difficult to deal with in practice. In other words, we here have a clear case of an anecdote – both in the sense of personal experience and testimony – that can be a good reason to accept the truth of some proposition. Notice two things, though: the claim is not a causal one, and the plausibility (or prior probability) of it being true is pretty high since we know people do in fact cheat on each other regularly. I’ll explain what the latter means in a bit, but let’s move on to anecdotes as evidence for causal claims.

    So consider the causal proposition “I took medicine X, I got better, therefore I got better because of medicine X”. This claim is much more complicated than the one about Mary, and you can’t determine whether it’s true simply by looking or making a few observations. Why? Because causality is counterfactual: to say A caused B, is to say B would not have occurred if A had not occurred. (There is a long-standing and complicated philosophical debate about causality. Take it from me: steer clear and stick to the counterfactual view). So, on our example, when you claim “medicine X caused my recovery” you’re committed to the counterfactual proposition that you wouldn’t have gotten better had you not taken medicine X. And you simply cannot, even in principle, know this. For one thing, you have an immune system (gasp!) which may have fought off your infection irrespective of whether you took the medicine. Alternatively, you could have ingested some other substance - maybe you took medicine Y as well, maybe you ate something therapeutic - that took care of the infection. In other words, there are a whole bunch of things - i.e. confounds - that could have caused your recovery, and a single observation – the source of an anecdote – simply cannot distinguish between them. In general, the only reliable way to establish the truth or falsity of causal claims is to do controlled experiments. Let’s look at this a bit more closely.

    Assume we are trying to understand the causal relationship between four dichotomous and independent variables (A-D) and a particular dichotomous outcome (O). Assume also that these four variables exhaust the universe of all variables even conceivably related to the outcome. Our aim is to make either inclusion inferences (i.e. conclude the relevant variable has a causal relationship to the outcome) or exclusion inferences (i.e. that the variable does not have a causal relationship to the outcome). Given these assumptions, inclusion inferences are valid only when, from:

    A1   B1   C1   D1  =>  O1
    A2   B1   C1   D1  => O2

    it is concluded that A1 caused O1. The inference is valid because all the variables except one (A) was controlled – held constant – and given the outcome changed, it follows that A is causally related to O. Exclusion inferences are valid only when, from:

    A1   B1   C1    D1   =>  O1
    A2   B1   C1    D1   =>  O1

    it is concluded A1 is not causally related to O1. Again, the validity of the argument is assured because all the variables save one (A) was controlled. Given that A varies while O does not, it follows that A is not causally related to O. Notice that in both cases we are comparing one outcome with a counterfactual. The process of engineering such comparisons is called experimentation and it is at the very heart of the scientific method. (These, by the way, are versions of Mill's Methods).

    If we want to determine whether medicine X can cure some disease, we cannot rely on anecdotes because they don’t allow for counterfactual comparison. Assume, for example, that A1 is taking medicine X, and A2 is not taking it; that B1 is having an immune system, and B2 not; that C1 is taking medicine Y, and C2 not taking it; that D1 is being overweight, D2 is not being overweight; and, finally, that O1 is getting better and O2 is not getting better. When we have a single observation - we know that Thaba over there took medicine X, has a healthy immune system, that he isn't taking medicine Y, that he's rather overweight and that he got better after a few days - all we have is:

    A1   B1   C1    D2   =>  O1

    We have no proper counterfactual: we have not controlled for variables B, C, or D so we can't make any logical inferences about variable A. (Making this inference is the post hoc fallacy). At best, we can say that taking the medicine is possibly related to getting better, but then the same goes for B, C and D. Note also that adding more anecdotes does not resolve our problem: in the real world there are many more than just four variables so things are much more complicated, experiments involving humans are always possibly confounded by the placebo effect, and, importantly, the variables may interact in complex ways. In the oft repeated phrase, the plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data. Thousands of anecdotes are no more convincing that a single anecdote. As a result, then, anecdotes cannot in general (that is, barring extreme exceptions) establish the truth or falsity of causal propositions.

    As I showed above anecdotes can reasonably be taken as convincing evidence for observational claims. But that does not mean we should believe every anecdote (concerning observational propositions). Bob Carrol of Skepdic (an excellent resource worth referring to often, by the way) nicely enumerates the possible problems:
    Anecdotes are unreliable for various reasons. Stories are prone to contamination by beliefs, later experiences, feedback, selective attention to details, and so on. Most stories get distorted in the telling and the retelling. Events get exaggerated. Time sequences get confused. Details get muddled. Memories are imperfect and selective; they are often filled in after the fact. People misinterpret their experiences. Experiences are conditioned by biases, memories, and beliefs, so people's perceptions might not be accurate. Most people aren't expecting to be deceived, so they may not be aware of deceptions that others might engage in. Some people make up stories. Some stories are delusions. Sometimes events are inappropriately deemed psychic simply because they seem improbable when they might not be that improbable after all. In short, anecdotes are inherently problematic and are usually impossible to test for accuracy.
    In other words, while anecdotes can be good evidence for believing observational propositions - "x happened" - for the reasons listed above, we certainly can't accept all anecdotes uncritically. So what to do? Life is impossible if we dismiss all anecdotes, but we'll be led astray if we accept all anecdotes. The solution is skepticism: that is, being open minded but then filtering beliefs through a bullshit detector. Doing this is simple in principle, but incredibly difficult in practice, so some examples are in order. (Recommended books: Thinking About Thinking by Anthony Flew, The Demon-Haunted World by Carl Sagan [my review], Truth by Simon Blackburn [my review], and Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me) by Travis & Aronson [my review]).

    Megan Fox: not in Jeff's league. 
    One of the most important and useful bullshit detecting skills is weighing up the evidence against the plausibility of the claim (here is an example of me doing this). Determine, firstly, how plausible the claim is given everything else we know. For example, given everything I know about my friend Jeff, people in general and the state of technology, the proposition that he has flown in an airplane at least once is highly plausible. (He is middle-class, airplane tickets are cheap and abundant, I've seen him in other cities, etc.). On the contrary, given everything we know, it is extremely implausible that he once had a threesome with Megan Fox and Jessica Alba. (For one thing, he is short and balding. For another,  he's never been to the US). The threesome claim is an extraordinary one: given what we know about attractive celebrities, balding South African men, sexual psychology, and so on, Jeff having a threesome with Fox and Alba is just not the kind of thing we expect to happen. Having determined the plausibility of a claim, the next step is to assess the strength of the evidence. In our example, all the evidence we have is Jeff's testimony. As Bob Carrol explained above, anecdotes are often unreliable because people suffer from innumerable cognitive biases and, more obviously, they sometimes lie. Since in the Alba-Fox example Jeff has a strong motivation to lie - having it believed is highly status-enhancing - his testimony is further undermined. What we have, then, is an extraordinary claim, the only evidence for which is very weak. It is reasonable, then, to withhold assent until better evidence is provided.

    A somewhat more enlightening example is alien abduction. People from all over the world claim to have been abducted by extraterrestrials and then molested, lectured on the necessity of world peace, and so on. So, step one: how plausible are these claims? Given what we know about physics and human psychology, not very. First of all, we currently have no evidence that life - let alone intelligent life - exists anywhere else in the universe. (My gut tells me alien life is abundant, but as Carl Sagan pointed out, we shouldn't think with our guts). Secondly, if intelligent life does exist, the aliens will in all likelihood be tens of light-years or more distant, and, since we have no reason to think faster than light travel is practicable, there is no known way for aliens to get to earth in a reasonable period of time. Step two: what about the evidence? Again we have anecdotes: tales from people who claim to have been abducted. Significantly for this example, there is a highly plausible alternative explanation that undermines the evidentiary status of the accounts, namely, hypnogogia and hympnopompia. Briefly, these are vivid hallucinations that occur as you're falling asleep or waking up that are accompanied by sleep paralysis. Typically, a person wakes up terrified and unable to move, senses (an often malevolent) 'presence' in the room, and may also experience a variety of visual, auditory and proprioceptionary hallucinations. Tellingly, this well-studied phenomenon closely mirrors accounts of alien abduction, which often feature extreme fear, a 'presence' in the room, and being unable to move. Since these experiences are accompanied by visual hallucinations and alien visitation is a common trope in popular culture, the other reported experiences are easily accounted for. Importantly, also, hypnogogia and hypnopompia are common (much more common than claims of alien abduction). Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Since claims of abduction are extraordinary, anecdotes of being abducted are far from extraordinary evidence, so, until much more evidence is provided, it is reasonable to withhold assent.

    So... what exactly is the evidentiary status of anecdotes? In summary: (1) anecdotes on their own can never establish the truth or falsity of causal propositions. (2) While anecdotes can be evidence for observational propositions, the plausibility of the claim must be taken into account. To be believed, highly implausible claims require much, much more than mere anecdotes.

    Wednesday, April 7, 2010

    Guest post: Neuroscience through Optogenetics

    A guest post from Hugh Pastollmy good friend and long-time intellectual sparring partner. Hugh's introduction follows, and then his article. 

    Michael and I met while studying PPE at the University of Cape Town. Like him, I’ve completely changed direction since then and am now doing a PhD in Computational Neuroscience at the University of Edinburgh.

    As part of my postgraduate studies I’ve been fortunate enough to use an exciting new and truly revolutionary technology known as optogenetics. Optogenetics permits fine-grained control of brain activity with light, dramatically increasing the range of interesting experiments we can do. Since it is likely that it will soon become the technology of choice for investigating brain function, Michael has invited me to give a short primer on optogenetics in general and channelrhodopsins in particular.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a computational neuroscientist I am ultimately motivated by understanding how neural activity determines behavior. Frustratingly, for a long time even attempting to answer this sort of question has been pretty much impossible. This has been a major barrier to understanding how brains work… until recently.

    To see why we have been stuck, imagine that I want to test the hypothesis that some pattern of neural activity causes a particular behavior. In order to test this hypothesis I’d need to conduct an experiment where I manipulated the animal’s neural activity and observed its behavior (simply noticing that the pattern and behavior both occur when I give the animal a stimulus only establishes correlation, not causality). Now, we’ve been able to control neural activity for quite a while - the sticking point was that we weren’t able to do it with the millisecond fidelity, neuron type specificity and sub-cubic-millimeter spatial precision we need to test most of our important hypotheses.

    To illustrate, say I hypothesize that synchronized firing of excitatory neurons in the subthalamic nucleus at 20 Hz is responsible for akinesia (deficit in movement initiation). Testing this typical hypothesis would require me to synchronize only sub-thalamic excitatory neurons without changing their overall firing rate or affecting activity in nearby brain areas while the animal is behaving. I can’t think of any way we would have to able to accomplish this with drugs, electrical stimulation or any other standard technique for controlling neural activity.

    Thanks to the recent development of optogenetics, though, such control is not only possible, but relatively easy. I can’t really exaggerate how completely cool this is - it is going to allow the field of computational neuroscience to hit its stride and start delivering the kinds of insights we need to understand what’s really going on in the brain.

    So how does optogenetics work? To understand this, you need to know how ion channels control action potentials in neurons. Very briefly, ion channels are specialized protein channels that, when open, conduct ions (charged molecules) across cell membranes. The brief rise in membrane potential during an action potential is due to positive ions rapidly moving from the outside to the inside of a cell. Channelrhodopsins are ion channels that open when you shine blue light on them! This means we can force the membrane potential of a neuron to become more positive and generate an action potential. This is the ‘opto’ part of optogenetics.

    Channelrhodopsin-2 (ChR2 - the most useful original kind) was first described in a species of green algae called Chlamydomonas reinhardtii in 2002 and found to work in mammalian neurons. Since then, genetic engineers have found that strategically mutating different amino acids changes the kinetics of the channel (how quickly it opens and closes). So, now there are different versions that allow different types of control. The fastest type (named ChETA ) opens in about 2 milliseconds and closes after about 5ms; fast enough to pulse blue light at 200 Hz and have the neuron fire at virtually every pulse. Another type (ChR2-C128S) usually takes minutes to close but shuts off very quickly if you shine green light on it. This means it can act as a kind of bi-stable on-off neuron switch. With such fine-grained control we can manipulate neuron spiking in pretty much any way we like.

    Now for the ‘genetic’ part of optogenetics: Different kinds of neurons make different kinds of proteins. Since channelrhodopsin is a protein, we can use the cellular machinery that determines whether a protein is expressed in a neuron to restrict channelrhodopsin expression to a specific type of neuron.
    This allows us to make one type of neuron in an area fire, without directly disrupting the normal activity of other types in the same area, giving us the neuron sub-type specificity we need for our experiments.

    Furthermore, we can restrict channelrhodopsin expression to a very small area of the brain. Since we know that genes code for proteins, if only cells in one area have the channelrhodopsin gene only those cells in that area will respond to light. We can accomplish this by infecting a group of neurons with a non-replicating retrovirus that carries the channelrhodopsin gene. This gene will then be integrated into the genome of the infected neurons and expressed, introducing channelrhodopsins with spatial specificity.

    However, although this combination of temporal, neuron sub-type and spatial specificity will enable a wide range of experiments, even more is possible. Another class of membrane proteins, known as halorhodopsins, have the opposite effect to channelrhodopsins. Halorhodopsins are not passive channels - they actively pump negative ions into a cell when illuminated with yellow light, making it more negative and stopping it from firing. Additionally, proteins that pump positive hydrogen ions out of cells to make their interior more negative have been described recently. These proteins are more effective than some types of halorhodopsins at preventing neurons from firing and different types respond to a different light colors – allowing researchers to pick colors that don't interfere with other rhodopsins the animal may also be expressing.

    With such powerful optogenetic tools at our disposal we can imagine performing complex experiments, orchestrating neural activity with an array of different color intra-cranial LEDs. Although such experiments will be technically challenging, at the moment it feels like we are only limited by our imagination.

    Selected references:
    Nagel, G. et al. (2002) "Channelrhodopsin-2, a directly light-gated cation-selective membrane channel," PNAS, doi:10.1073/pnas.193619210.
    Boyden, E. et al. (2005) "Millisecond-timescale genetically targeted optical control of neural activity," Nature Neuroscience, doi:10.1038/nn1525
    Berndt, A. et al. (2008) "Bi-stable neural state switches," Nature Neuroscience, doi:10.1038/nn.2247
    Gradinaru, V. et al. (2009) "Optical deconstruction of Parkinsonian neural circuitry," Science, doi:10.1126/science.1167093
    Chow, B. et al. (2010) "High-performance genetically targetable optical neural silencing by light-driven proton pumps," Nature, doi:10.1038/nature08652
    Gunaydin, L. et al. (2010) "Ultrafast optogenetic control," Nature Neuroscience, doi:10.1038/nn.2495

    Wednesday, February 24, 2010

    Encephalon #80: The Twitter Edition

    Welcome to the 80th edition of Encephalon (@encephalon_), the world's best mindy/brainy/behaviory blag carnival! Since I've finally joined the whole Twitter party properly (@michaelmeadon), I figured making this the Twitter Edition would be fun. It also features an entirely gratuitous picture of a hot bird (haha), right. So, here are some 'Tweets', all < 140 characters... (The @xxx's refer to the relevant person's Twitter account, if there is one, and the link at the end of each 'Tweet' goes to the blog entry).
    That's it! There doesn't seem to be a host for the next Encephalon yet, so volunteer! 

      Tuesday, December 22, 2009

      Encephalon #79

      The 79th and year-end edition of Encephalon is out at The Mouse Trap. Posts to check out: Neuronarrative on further evidence that our memories are highly fallible, and The Neurocritic on the neurobiology of internet addiction...

      Wednesday, November 18, 2009

      Encephalon #78

      The 78th edition of the mind/brain/psychology/etc. carnival Encephalon is out at Providentia. Posts to check out: Generally Thinking on the Buddhist brain, Brain Stimulant on neurorobotics, and The Neurocritic on unusual sexual changes due to various types of brain damage (including a kind of tumor-induced pedophilia).

      My posts on estimating formidability from bodies and faces were featured.

      Thursday, November 12, 2009

      Adaptations for the visual assessment of formadibility: Part II

      In Part I of this series, I summarized the experiments and findings of Aaron Sell and colleagues' paper "Human adaptations for the visual assessment of strength and fighting ability from the body and face". In Part II, I evaluate their claims.

      The evidence Sell et. al. present seems compelling with regards to proposition (i): adults appear to be able to make remarkably accurate estimates of upper-body strength from even degraded cues such as static images of faces. As I noted in Part I, however, the truth of propositions (ii) (that this ability is an adaptation) and (iii) (that upper-body strength determines formidability) are more doubtful. I will assess the evidence for each of these claims, starting with the latter.

      Tuesday, November 10, 2009

      Adaptations for the visual assessment of formidability: Part I

      In the last couple of years there has been an explosion in research on faces and what can be inferred from them. It turns out, for example, that you can predict electoral outcomes from rapid and unreflective facial judgments, that women can (partially) determine a man's level of interest in infants from his face alone, that the facial expression of fear enhances sensory acquisition, and much, much else. A particularly interesting addition to this literature is Aaron Sell and colleagues' paper, "Human adaptations for the visual assessment of strength and fighting ability from the body and face". Sell et. al. hypothesized that human beings possess evolved psychological mechanisms 'designed' to estimate the fighting ability (or physical formidability) of conspecifics - i.e. other Homo sapiens sapiens - from minimal visual information. An ancillary, but important, claim the authors also make is that formidability is largely a function of upper-body strength and thus the latter is a suitable proxy for the former. To summarize for clarity, Sell et. al. claim that: 
      • (i) people can estimate the formidability of others from visual cues of their bodies and faces, 
      • (ii) this ability is an adaptation, and thus evolved by natural selection, and
      • (iii) upper-body strength is the single most important determining factor of fighting ability. 
      The authors’ rationale for the first two hypotheses stems from the observation that in social species such as humans, ‘the magnitude of the costs an individual can inflict on competitors largely determines its negotiating position’ (p. 575). That is, formidability is often an important component of an organism’s ability to compete in zero-sum games (notably, access to limiting resources). Given the dangers of physical confrontation, a rapid visual assessment of the formidability of an opponent could be extremely beneficial because it would allow an individual to weigh up its chances of success, and thus choose to fight only when there is a reasonable prospect of victory. Indeed, Sell et. al. note that the widespread so-called ritualized animal contests are best interpreted as joint demonstrations and assessments of formidability, with physical violence usually ensuing only when individuals are closely matched. If the ability to visually estimate a competitor’s formidability was indeed adaptive, and if violence was frequent and recurrent throughout human evolutionary history (as is likely the case), it is not unreasonable to expect natural selection to have forged mechanisms to make such estimates. Sell and his colleagues tested hypothesis (i) empirically in a number of studies and the evidence seems to bear it out overall. While the truth of (ii) is more doubtful, I will argue that, pending further research, it is reasonable to accept it preliminarily for a number of reasons. Finally, I will argue the lack of empirical evidence in the study for (iii) is problematic but not decisively so: it is clear that there is a correlation between upper-body strength and formidability, but we do not know how strong this correlation is so it is difficult to judge how good a proxy the one is for the other.


      After the jump, I summarize Sell et. al.'s primary findings (though I leave out one of their experiments). In Part II - coming later in the week - I evaluate their paper.


      Thursday, October 29, 2009

      Encephalon #77

      The 77th edition of Encephalon (along with Grand Rounds) is out at Sharp Brains. Pieces to check out: Mind Hacks on the curious spike in brain activity at the moment of death (and how this may explain near death experiences), Neurophilosophy on how vision can alleviate pain, and The Neuroctitic on the same.

      Monday, October 19, 2009

      Gene Callahan vs Evolutionary Psychology

      So I recently had an uncharacteristic (and unpleasant) online altercation with one Gene Callahan about evolutionary psychology and, amazingly, whether Daniel Dennett should be taken seriously. I'm not blogging about this because it is inherently interesting (it's not), but because it nicely illustrates several common misconceptions about applying evolution to psychology and it reminds us that intellectual arrogance is a Bad Thing.

      (I’d like to note before proceeding that it’s not as if I’m an uncritical fan of evolutionary psychology. There are, I think, numerous problems in the field, and the standards of evidence is far too often far too low. Some papers in the field are downright embarrassing (this one is the worst I’ve come across) and on my blog I have, among other things, excoriated Satoshi Kanazawa and critiqued Shermer’s application of evolutionary psychology to markets.)

      Anyway, the saga in question started when a friend shared a blog post of Callahan’s on Google Reader in which he endorses John Dupré’s Human Nature and the Limits of Science, an uninformed screed against evolutionary thinking in psychology. (See this critique). I won’t have that much to say about the content of Callahan’s post – I will focus on his replies to my comments – but one remark about it is in order. Callahan:
      I’ve just been re-reading John Dupre’s wonderful take-down of evolutionary psychology, Human Nature and the Limits of Science. Now, Dupre never disputes the obvious truism that, say, human ethics or religion evolved. But he notes that this is remarkably uninformative, since everything humans do so (sic) evolved, including their ability to write papers on evolutionary psychology!
      This is somewhat cryptic and unclear, but straightforwardly interpreted, it is obviously wrong. To see why, consider the following. (I) Phenotypic structures (more precisely, biological processes) are either adaptations or the by-products of adaptations. (II) What distinguishes evolutionary psychology (at least of the Santa Barbara School) from sociobiology is the claim (see Tooby & Cosmides, 1987 [pdf]) that manifest behavior doesn’t evolve, modular information processing systems embedded in brains do. (III) Behavior is the result of a complex interaction between the environment and these information-processing systems; including direct environmental influences (e.g. drugs, brain injury) on the physical substrate of these information-processors. Observed behavior, then, is the product of the environment interacting with information processing mechanisms in the brain, and the brain is constituted of adaptations – structures that exist just because they increased fitness relative to alternatives in evolutionary history, including by producing or facilitating certain behaviors – or the by-products of such adaptations. It is therefore false that ‘everything humans do evolved’ since behaviors themselves don’t evolve, some behaviors result from by-products of evolution (not to mention pathology), and rapidly changing environments (the appearance of development of civilization, say) can interact with evolved psychological traits to produce novel behaviors (including writing papers on evolutionary psychology). The proposition that evolutionary psychology – broadly construed – is uninformative stems from these misunderstandings, and is indistinguishable from the crazy idea that evolutionary thinking generally is uninformative. Moreover, this claim is belied by the fact that we have discovered psychological abilities and traits (e.g., e.g.) that we didn't know about until we thought about human psychology from an evolutionary perspective.

      On to the actual altercation… Callahan’s post rather annoyed me, so I left an aggressive – probably too aggressive – comment to the effect that (a) he is unqualified to have an opinion and (b) that he should read Daniel Dennett’s critique of the book. On reflection, I regret making point (a) as baldly as I did: I failed to err on the side of charity and to assume good faith. (Not to mention that I took Wikipedia’s word that he’s an economist, when he self-identifies as a philosopher, though I can’t help pointing out that he has a PhD in neither, so appending “in-training” is appropriate. Note: I don’t have a PhD either, so I happily concede I’m a wannabe cognitive scientist, not the real deal... yet). Understandably, Callahan didn’t take too kindly to my comment, so he replied aggressively himself, and then headed over to my blog and threw insults around on two of my posts: here and here. (Some tangential pedagogy: as I explained at length in my Fun with Fallacies post a while back, there is a difference between the ad hominem logical fallacy and mere insult. Callahan [I think, the comment was anonymous] calling me a “rude little punk”, for example, is not an instance of the ad hominem logical fallacy; even saying ‘you’re wrong and a rude little punk’ wouldn’t be fallacious. Only if he had said (or implied) ‘you’re wrong because you’re a rude little punk’ would he have committed the fallacy. There must be some inference drawn from some purported negative quality for the fallacy to occur, merely alleging someone has a negative quality is not itself fallacious, though of course it may be false or libellous).

      Anyway, Callahan’s reaction to (b) was remarkable and illustrative: he dismissed Dennett’s critique of Dupré without reading it because he thinks Dennett’s work is a “rubbish heap”. Here’s what he said:
      “Oh, and I’m not going to bother reading his [Dennett's] criticisms of Dupre. If I read several things by someone and they are universally rubbish, I really can’t be bothered to keep going through the rubbish heap. Anyone dull enough to have come up with the ‘brights’ idea really can be dismissed out of hand, don’t you think?”
      Wow. The first sentence is the most interesting, but note that the second is factually inaccurate (Dennett endorsed the Brights idea – as did Dawkins – but neither came up with it) and invalid to boot. Worse, the suppressed premise (pdf) that would make the argument valid - ‘anyone who has one really daft idea can be dismissed out of hand (on all topics)’ – is clearly false. Granting for argument’s sake that the Brights idea was daft, it’s simply not true that if someone has one spectacularly bad idea that everything else they say will be wrong. Newton had silly ideas about alchemy and the Bible, but that doesn’t mean we can dismiss the Principia. Linus Pauling obstinately stuck to the incredibly implausible notion that ultra-high doses of Vitamin C can cure cancer, but that doesn't mean his work in chemistry was worthless. Physicists with idiotic philosophical or religious views are a dime a dozen, but that doesn’t mean their work as physicists is necessarily bad. Is it really that surprising that a philosopher and a ethologist, respectively, could be persuaded to endorse a bad marketing idea? If they did so would it mean that their professional work was all worthless?

      Callahan’s first point in the above paragraph, though, is far more interesting and so worth looking into in a bit more detail. At first I thought he couldn’t possibly believe it – that perhaps he was just pissed off and said something silly in the heat of the moment – but he failed to back down in subsequent comments, so he really does seem to believe it. In summary, his argument is: ‘I read x% of Dennett’s work, what I read was universally rubbish, therefore everything by Dennett is rubbish’. (Callahan calls Dennett's work 'a rubbish heap', so he's not just making the more reasonable claim that 'he couldn't be bothered to read more of it'). This argument too is invalid - though of course I hardly expect people to make consistently logically valid arguments in blog comments. The point is that it contains at least one false suppressed premise, namely: ‘if I’ve read some proportion of a scholar’s work, I can judge all of it.’ This is both arrogant and false, the latter since for it to be true everyone would have to produce either consistent rubbish or consistent non-rubbish: it implausibly rules out a mixed bag. Newton, again, produced utter nonsense and sublime science, Jared Diamond wrote both Guns, Germs, and Steel (one of the best books of the 90s is my opinion) and Why is Sex Fun? (which was very bad indeed) and so on.

      As a rule of thumb, I’d say that unless (1) you have read a good proportion of some scholar’s output, (2) you are qualified to judge all of it, and unless (3) everything you have read is entirely devoid of merit and without any redeeming qualities whatsoever, making a black-and-white inference about an entire corpus of work is just not reasonable. (People who make a priori unlikely claims in conflict with scientific consensus, show no interest in justifying their claims, and who lack relevant expertise can in most cases be dismissed out of hand. Sylvia Brown’s books, for example, are just not worth paying attention to. I take it as obvious that Dennett does not come close to fulfilling these criteria). Given how much Dennett has produced I’m willing to bet Callahan has not satisfied (1), and I have serious doubts about (2) since as far as I know not even Callahan himself claims to be a qualified cognitive scientist or philosopher of mind. More importantly, the prior probability of (3) is preposterously low and Callahan thus has a huge burden of proof to discharge. For him to do so he would not only have to demonstrate (preferably in a mainstream peer-reviewed journal) that, say, Consciousness Explained (CE) and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (DDI) are rubbish but also explain why so many smart people – whether they agree with Dennett or not – were fooled into concluding the opposite. In other words, he must rigorously justify his initial contention not only that Dennett is wrong, but so wrong that his work is entirely worthless. And, if Dennett’s work is indeed utter rubbish, Callahan must explain why Dennett has been so influential: why, for example, CE has been cited 4700+ times and DDI 3000+ times. (Callahan objected to this point by saying it merely shows Dennett is famous, and mere fame presumably doesn’t track genuine merit. I responded that there’s a distinction between fame and influence: Dennett is both, Paris Hilton is only the former, Frege (say) is only the latter, and both Callahan and I are neither. Scholars just don’t see the need to read, let alone refer or respond to, utter rubbish so either Callahan is wrong or thousands of highly trained and really intelligent people are deluded. Of course, Callahan could be right, but I wouldn't recommend betting on it).

      The moral of the preceding analysis, I think, is that intellectual arrogance is a very Bad Thing. I admit that I’m not exactly diffident, and that I have regularly fallen afoul of the principles I outline below. But I’m not nearly arrogant enough to dismiss whole disciples or declare all of an influential and prolific academic’s work utter rubbish. The common cause of such extreme beliefs, it seems to me, is overweening intellectual self-confidence, which is in turn arguably a product of an insufficient familiarity with one’s own fallibility. Cognitive biases and illusions are universal and ineradicable, the world is incredibly complicated and you can know only a fraction of the currently knowable. The mark of someone familiar with the above is scepticism, suspicion of bald assertions and hasty generalization, doubt, caution, a willingness to reconsider and admit error, and being scrupulously careful with facts and arguments. Callahan, it seems to me, fails to live up to these principles and the result is beliefs that, frankly, are downright idiotic. Or, as I put it rather more colorfully in my comments on his post, if these really are his beliefs, he should STFU, GTFO and take his FAIL with him. Srsly.

      Of course, I could be wrong. Maybe I've been blinded by emotion, maybe I've been unfair, maybe I've misunderstood. If so, show me I'm wrong and I'll reconsider. Really.

      Sunday, October 18, 2009

      Encephalon #76

      The 76th edition of Encephalon is out over at Neuroskeptic. Posts to check out: The Neurocritic asks whether neuroscience tells us torture doesn't work, Neurophilosophy on how vegetative and minimally conscious pantiens can learn, and Crime and Consequences on the silliness of neurolaw.